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Wages in Kind and Economic Development: 






This paper investigates the function of various modes of wage payment, focusing on the role of 
in-kind wages in enhancing household food security when markets are underdeveloped. Historical 
records from Asian countries, including pre-war Japan and colonial India, demonstrate the importance 
of in-kind wage payment in the initial phase of economic development. However, there is a paucity of 
theoretical explanations of in-kind wages in terms of their function and rationale in existing literature. 
This paper therefore develops a theoretical model that explains labor supply under different labor 
contracts, by incorporating considerations of food security as the main explanation for in-kind wages. 
The model predicts that when food security considerations are important for workers, owing to 
poverty and thin food markets, they tend to work more under contracts where wages are paid in kind 
(food) than under contracts where wages are paid in cash. This prediction is supported by empirical 
evidence from rural Myanmar. Estimation results of the reduced-form determinants of labor supply 
show that workers supply more labor for work paid in kind when the share of staple food in the 
workers’ household budget is higher and the farmlands on which they produce food themselves are 
smaller.  
JEL classification codes: J33, Q12, O12 
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1  Introduction 
Economic development is a process that is manifest through not only economic growth but 
also associated changes in production structures and transaction modes. Worldwide, economic 
development has been facilitated by commercialization of various goods and services among which 
production factors, especially labor and land, were the last to be commercialized (Hicks, 1969). Even 
in an economy where labor has become a market commodity, it is difficult to empirically investigate 
the efficiency and surplus distribution in the labor market. One of the reasons for this is the existence 
of various types of labor contracts. In developing countries today as in developed countries earlier, 
employer-farmers adopt a variety of compensation policies when hiring labor from outside the family. 
Contracts differ in terms of incentives (piece rate versus fixed wage), contract periods (daily, seasonal, 
or lifetime), payment materials (cash, grains, meals, clothing, etc.), and interlinkage with other 
contracts such as those for credit and land use (Roumasset and Lee, 2007). Under this heterogeneity, 
calculating “wage” as the price of labor is not a simple task.
1 
Considering the complexity associated with labor contracts, the question of what determines 
which compensation policy is chosen and how the choice of policy affects the efficiency and equity of 
labor transactions has been discussed extensively in the literature on economic development 
(Rosenzweig, 1988; Hayami and Otsuka, 1993; Roumasset and Lee, 2007). In particular, the practice 
of sharecropping, a type of contract in which a land-use right and labor are transacted in an interlinked 
way, has been investigated in detail. There are also a number of studies on the interlinkage of labor 
and credit transactions. 
On the other hand, there is limited empirical research on the different compensation policies 
used to hire labor during the process of economic development. Among the few existing studies on 
this subject, Foster and Rosenzweig (1994) demonstrate that in rural India, the level of moral hazard 
differed according to the type of labor contract—on-farm employment (family labor), piece-rate 
payment scheme, share-tenancy contract, or time-wage payment scheme. Further, Fukui (1995) 
investigates the efficiency of permanent labor contracts in the Philippines where compensation 
consisted of piece-rate wages paid in kind, and Datta et al. (2004) study the mechanisms responsible 
for the co-existence of both cash and in-kind wages in rural India. Chiappori and Salanie (2003) state 
that one of the empirical difficulties surrounding wage policies pertained to the differentiation of the 
incentive impact of a contract from the selection effect caused by the endogenous adoption of existing 
institutions by economic agents. 
Taking the findings of the above-mentioned studies as the point of departure, this paper 
focuses on the role of in-kind wages in ensuring household-level food security in the process of 
1When labor transactions are interlinked with credit or land-lease transactions, it does not make sense to define 
wage separately from rewards to land or credit. The set of wage and land rent (or interest rate) needs to be 
investigated in analyzing the efficiency and equity outcome of the interlinkage (Basu, 1983). 
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economic development. Odaka (2004) argues that it is important to understand the economic meaning 
and impact of the various modes of labor transactions and types of labor contracts in the historical 
context of each economy. Such an understanding is critical to the design of apposite labor policies in 
developing countries for rapid poverty alleviation. This paper is an attempt to understand the process 
of economic development among the rural populace in developing Asian countries by focusing on 
in-kind wages—an important element in the early stages of economic development that has lost its 
significance with modern economic growth. Considering in-kind wages as a salient feature relevant 
for low-income developing countries but one that has not been appropriately analyzed in existing 
literature, this paper proposes a theoretical model in which in-kind wages can enhance the food 
security of rural households faced with thin food markets and missing insurance markets. The 
predictions of the theoretical model are supported empirically with household data from rural 
Myanmar (formerly Burma). The micro dataset used in this paper is apt because multiple modes of 
wage payments co-existed within the study village for the same farming operation; such variation is 
hard to find in other datasets because wage payment modes are usually unique within a village for a 
farming operation, even when payment modes show considerable variation across villages or farming 
operations. 
Another motivation for this paper is the issue of kind versus cash payment in non-labor 
transactions. Labor is not the only service that is remunerated in cash or kind. Land rent and credit are 
other examples. Regarding land rent, the transformation of cash rent into kind rent has been 
investigated extensively in the context of the economic history of England, because inflation reduced 
the real value of cash rent and improved the profitability of tenant farmers, thereby contributing to the 
establishment of capitalistic tenant farming.
2  Since an analysis of both labor and land tenancy 
contracts can complicate the analytical framework, this paper focuses on the issue of kind versus cash 
payment in labor transactions. 
In contemporary Myanmar, farming is practiced through the peasant mode of production 
without the use of labor-saving machinery. Inequity in land holdings is at a moderate level and land 
tenancy transactions are rare due to legal restrictions. A combination of these conditions has resulted 
in active labor transactions that along with the existence of various payment modes make Myanmar an 
ideal study area for the empirical analysis this paper aims to perform. Analyzing the interaction 
between labor and labor transactions with in-kind wages is left for further research using different 
datasets. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 demonstrates the importance of 
in-kind wages in the initial phase of economic development by compiling historical records from 
Asian countries, including pre-war Japan and colonial India. Section 3 reviews the theoretical 
literature on in-kind wages. Section 4 presents a theoretical model to explain how rural households’ 









   
 
   
   
     
 
   
     
 
   
 
 
   
     
       
     
 
       
 
     
 
 
     
     
 
labor allocation is decided between cash and kind wages. Section 5 tests the predictions of the model 
against empirical findings using household data from rural Myanmar, and Section 6 concludes the 
paper. 
2  Wages in Kind: Evidence of Their Incidence from Historical and 
Contemporary Datasets 
This section demonstrates the incidence of in-kind wages in agriculture by compiling micro 
datasets from Asian countries. Although few in number, there are historical sources that offer detailed 
household-level information on labor transactions. There is no comparison of historical in-kind wages 
with contemporary micro data in developing countries as yet in existing literature. This paper makes a 
pioneering attempt in this direction, covering pre-war Japan, colonial India, contemporary India and 
Pakistan, and contemporary Myanmar. 
For the purpose of analysis in this paper, agricultural laborers are classified into three 
categories: “permanent laborers,” who are permanently employed without a specified contract period, 
also called attached laborers or regular farm servants; “seasonal laborers,” who are employed for a 
specific period in a year, usually during the agriculturally busy season, ranging from a few months to 
a year; and “daily laborers,” who are usually employed for a few days at most. Both permanent and 
seasonal laborers are engaged in various farming operations, including the general management of 
standing crops; in contrast, daily laborers are employed for specific farming operations. 
2.1  Japan 
An exceptionally long time series of agricultural wage statistics is available for pre-war 
Japan, beginning with the first half of 19
th century (late Edo period) when labor markets first emerged 
in rural areas (Saito, 1998; 2005). The standard time series from the start of the Meiji period (1868–) 
was compiled by Umemura et al. (1966) and published as part of a Japanese research project called 
Long-term Economic Statistics (LTES). In the compilation of the time series, due care was taken to 
impute the value of meals since meals occupied a large share of the total cost borne by farmers hiring 
daily workers. According to Umemura et al. (1966), the imputed value of meals was roughly 30% of 
the cash wage paid to a daily laborer. Odaka (2004) states that the test for an equilibrium between the 
wage and the marginal product of farm labor depends on whether the imputed value of meals is 
included, and if it is, the manner in which it is done. It is possible that the employer-farmer in pre-war 
Japan subjectively regarded cash wages only as the marginal cost of hiring a daily laborer and saw 
meal provisions as a social obligation (Odaka, 2004). The share of the imputed value of meals in total 
wages in Japan during its early stage of economic development appear to be higher than that in China 




   
   
 
   
 
   
   
   
   
     
   
     
   
       
   
     
   
       
   
 
   
 
   
     
       
 
                                                       
   
 
In focusing on remuneration through meal provision in pre-war Japan, both historians and 
governments paid little attention to other forms of in-kind rewards. This is because the main 
component of wages other than meals was paid in cash from the late Edo period onward in the major 
agricultural regions in Japan. According to The Survey of Agricultural Laborers conducted in 1920 
(Japanese Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 1921; 1926), however, there was anecdotal evidence 
supporting the provision of clothing and footwear to laborers, especially permanent laborers; further, 
regional variations were reported in the main reward component, which was in cash in the majority of 
regions but in unhusked rice and wheat in Tohoku Region and in some rice growing areas in Niigata 
and Hiroshima. However, these cases were noted as exceptions (Japanese Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry, 1926). In addition, the majority of farm work was accomplished by family labor in Japan; 
only occasionally was farm work supplemented by hired daily labor, implying that in-kind payment to 
permanent laborers was regarded as unimportant by policy makers in pre-war Japan. 
Various reports of Noka keizai chosa (The Survey of Agricultural Households) serve as 
historical records offering household-level information. This survey has been conducted by the 
Japanese Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry almost every year since the 1920s. It provides detailed 
information on farm accounting and family budgets of agricultural households, including the amount 
and mode of wages paid to daily and permanent laborers. In published reports of the surveys from 
1925 to 1930, household-level information is available in the appendix. Although the samples do not 
qualify as random samples of agricultural households in Japan at that time (the sample households 
were chosen by bureaucrats to represent farming households in each prefecture), the documented 
micro data are valuable, considering the general scarcity of such data. 
The 1925 report contains information on 65 owner-farm households in all prefectures 
excluding Hokkaido. Among the 65 farmers, 60 employed hired labor. For these 60 employer-farmers, 
Figure 1 plots the share of in-kind payment (the sum of the value of meals, grains, clothing, etc. 
provided to laborers) in the total payment (the sum of cash and in-kind payment) against the acreage 
of paddy fields owned. A positive (although weak) correlation is shown in the figure: farmers with 
larger paddy fields tended to pay more in in-kind wages.
3  Another point shown in the figure is large 
variation across regions. 
To show these relations more clearly, a regression model is applied to a repeated 
cross-sectional dataset
4  of owner-farm households in prefectures excluding Hokkaido for the six-year 
period from 1925 to 1930. The dependent variable is the same as the one plotted on the ordinate of 
Figure 1. The explanatory variables are the standardized values of the acreage of paddy fields owned 
by the employer-farmer, the acreage of upland fields, regional dummies, and year dummies. 
3No correlation was found when the abscissa was replaced by acreage of upland fields or acreage of the sum of 

paddy and upland fields. 

4Some of the sample households were surveyed repeatedly. Therefore, the dataset is an unbalanced panel dataset,
 
to be precise. However, because the number of years in which the same household was surveyed is small among 









       





   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
         
   
   
 
     




   
 
Regression results are reported in Table 1. The intercept shows that the average in-kind share was 
around 23%, which appears slightly lower than the imputed value share of 30% reported by Umemura 
(1966) for the late 19
th century. The coefficient on the paddy field size is statistically significant at the 
1% level, showing that the in-kind share increases by around 7.5% when the paddy field size 
increases by one standard deviation. The coefficient on the upland field size is not significant, 
suggesting that cash crops mostly cultivated on upland fields in Japan were not preferred as a 
commodity for in-kind payment. Among regional dummies, Kinki Region has a significantly negative 
coefficient, showing that the in-kind share was lower in Kinki than in Kanto by 10%, while Kyushu 
Region has a significantly positive coefficient, indicating that the in-kind share was higher in Kyushu 
than in Kanto by 14%. The regional contrast observed confirms the established view that economic 
development and commercialization did not set off at the same time all over Japan—Kinki was the 
first region to witness agricultural commercialization, while Kyushu was the last. The coefficients on 
year dummies in specification (i) of Table 1 or the coefficient on a linear trend in specification (ii) are 
all statistically insignificant, suggesting marginal change during the six-year period. 
After World War II, agrarian land reforms were implemented in Japan. The reforms 
transformed tenant-farm households, once the main provider of hired labor in agriculture, into 
owner-farm households. This led to a rapid decline in the hiring of agricultural labor. Further, 
compensation through meals for daily laborers was important only during the first few years after the 
war when there was a food deficit; it disappeared quickly as the economy recovered from the effects 
of the war. Currently, in-kind payment is not observed in Japanese agricultural labor markets. 
2.2  India  and  Pakistan 
In sharp contrast to Japan where the majority of farm work was done by family labor in a 
peasant mode of production, hired labor played an important role in South Asian agriculture. Owing 
in part to the caste-based division of labor, the landlord class did not prefer to perform manual farm 
work; instead, it concentrated on farm management, resulting in the prevalence of active labor 
transactions even among peasant households (Bardhan, 1984). 
Since the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947, the share of large holdings dependent on 
permanent and seasonal laborers has been on the decline in both countries. Various factors are 
responsible for this change: land reform legislation that has imposed ceilings on land holding acreages, 
equal division of land upon inheritance among children, and increase in non-farm employment 
opportunities in rural areas. On the other hand, the dependence on hired agricultural labor has not 
declined as fast as the share of large holdings has. In fact, the share of daily labor in the total hired 
labor has increased substantially in India and Pakistan. From the perspective of agricultural laborers 
as well, daily labor may be more attractive than seasonal or permanent labor because it is more 
compatible with non-farm work and means less social dependence on employers (landlords and rich 








     
     
     
     
 
   




   
   
 
   
   
 
   
 
 
             
 
                                                       
   




composition of rural households: the majority of rural households in the former were tenant- or 
owner-farm households, with very few households purely dependent on agricultural labor from 
outside the family, and rural households in the Indian subcontinent were divided into landed 
households and landless agricultural laborer households. 
Unfortunately, there are limited time-series or historical national data on the modes of 
compensation to agricultural laborers in India and Pakistan.
5  The incidence of in-kind wages in the 
subcontinent can be shown in two ways: (1) by the share of in-kind payment in the total payment 
made to laborers by employer-farmers, as done in the case of pre-war Japan, and (2) by the share of 
in-kind receipt in the total wage receipt of agricultural laborer households, which is not applicable to 
pre-war Japan because of its small number of agricultural laborer households. In recent years, 
household income and expenditure surveys in India and Pakistan have routinely covered rural 
population in their sampling framework. In several of such surveys, in-kind receipts are 
distinguishable from cash receipts, enabling us to compile the second index of in-kind wages.
6 Such 
information, however, is not available in historical records. On the other hand, the first index of 
in-kind wages can be compiled from available historical records, to which we now investigate. 
British Punjab in the 1920s and 30s 
Farm Accounts in the Punjab (FAP) is an example of a source of historical record on 
household-level information mentioned in the previous sub-section. In 1923/24,
7  the Board of 
Economic Inquiry, Lahore, first conducted farm account surveys in which detailed accounts of 
selected farms in the British Province of Punjab (roughly corresponding to regions currently in Punjab 
Province of Pakistan and the two Indian states of Punjab and Haryana) were collected. The initial 
reports covered 10 farms or thereabouts; later, the coverage increased to approximately 30 farms. 
Since the Board tried to track the same farms every year, some of the sample farms were re-surveyed 
over an extended period. Although their small number of observations and subjective choice of 
“representative” samples have to be carefully considered, the accounts are a valuable source of micro 
data on British Punjab’s agriculture.
8 
The 1925/26 report features the case of an owner-cum-tenant farm household with over 46.5 
acres of agricultural land in Lyallpur District (Stewart and Singh, 1927, pp.9-14). This farm belongs 
to a member of the upper social stratum in the Canal Colony of Punjab. In addition to 28 acres of land 
owned by the household, it rented 18.5 acres on a fixed cash rent basis. The farmer grew wheat (25 
acres), cotton (9.75 acres), chick pea (3.25 acres), and other crops, from which he obtained a gross 
5Hirashima (1978) notes that the lack of knowledge among planners and scholars in South Asia on the
 
socioeconomic conditions of non-farm households in rural areas is clearly reflected in the development theory
 
and policy they have produced (p.102). 

6See footnote 10, for example.

7This corresponds to the agricultural year, which stretches between July 1 and June 30.

8See Kurosaki (2001a) for the farm-level analysis of long-run changes in cropping patterns in Punjab, using the
 




   
 
   
       
   
 
   
   
       
     
 
     
   
   
 




   
 
   
     
 
       
   
     




revenue of Rs.4,654, out of which the farm expenditure came to Rs.2,028, including the cost of hired 
labor. In addition to family labor, the farmer hired two permanent laborers, one seasonal laborer for 
seven months, and some daily laborers. The payment to the two permanent laborers was imputed at 
Rs.457.6, all of which was made in kind. Each permanent laborer received 1/12 of the gross output of 
crop harvests, supplemented by a food allowance of wheat and maize (fixed amount of grains per 
year). The seasonal laborer received Rs. 74.1, of which 54% was in cash and the rest in kind such as 
meals, footwear, and clothing. The payment to daily laborers for farming operations other than 
harvesting was made in cash, amounting to Rs.16.9. The harvesting and winnowing laborers received 
their wages in kind (fixed share of harvested/winnowed amount); at the same time, instances of cash 
payment (about 13% of the payment) were also observed. Summing up all these payments, it turned 
out that 11.0% of the total payment was made in cash while 89.0% was made in kind. In addition to 
the payments to agricultural laborers, the farmer paid four Kammee households, such as the barber 
and carpenter.
9  The total payment made to the Kammee households amounted to Rs.53.4, all of which 
was in kind (grains and fodder). About one-fourth of the gross crop revenue was used as in-kind 
payment to laborers and artisans. As in-kind payment, 20.7% of the total produce of wheat, the staple 
crop in the region, was given to agricultural laborers and 1.7% to Kammee households. 
FAP reports provide micro data until the mid-1930s. The 1935/36 report shows detailed 
information on 27 permanent laborers hired by 24 farmers (Singh and Singh, 1938, p.33). The average 
annual earnings of permanent laborers was Rs.91, decomposed as follows: 28.9% in cash; 40.7% in 
the form of harvested crops (the imputed value kept by the laborers as fixed share); 25.5% in another 
form of in-kind payment (the imputed value of meals provided to the laborers or of food allowance 
(grains) given to the laborers); and 4.9% in clothing and others. The average share of in-kind 
payments including meals, weighted by the total payment value, was 71.1% (34.4%), and that of 
in-kind payments excluding meals was 45.6% (32.6%) (standard deviations [SD] in parentheses). Out 
of the 27 cases, 14 cases reported no cash payment. The 1934/35 FAP report also offers detailed 
information on 20 permanent laborers hired by 18 farmers. The average in-kind share was 71.1% 
including meals and 48.2% excluding meals, showing that the shares of in-kind payments were very 
stable in the short run. 
The variation in the modes of payment to permanent laborers appears to reflect regional and 
class variations. Over a longer horizon of the 1920s and 30s, minimal change was observed. For 
example, data of twelve years, from 1925/26 to 1936/37, are available for the Lyallpur farmer 
described above. The number of permanent laborers increased to three in years when additional land 
was hired in. Depending on the tasks assigned for each permanent laborer, the sharecropping ratio 
changed in the range from 1/15 to 1/10. Despite these changes, the basic pattern was very stable: 
9Kammee households are landless households in rural Punjab that provide artisan services to landed (Zamindar) 
households. Analogous to the Jajmani system in India, the Kammee-Zamindar relationship was regarded as a 
typical patron-client relation. See Hirashima (1978, Chap.8). 
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payment to permanent laborers through a combination of sharecropping and food allowance in grains 
(no cash payment to permanent laborers); cash payment to daily laborers for farming operations other 
than harvesting; and fixed share of harvested/winnowed amount for harvesting/winnowing laborers. 
Thus, historical records from British Punjab and pre-war Japan clearly show a contrast: 
During the 1920s and 30s, in-kind payments were more important in Punjab than in Japan. 
Pakistan Punjab in the 1980s and 90s 
Surveys for FAP continued in Pakistan Punjab, even after the partition of India and Pakistan 
in 1947. Random sampling was introduced and the number of observations was increased. FAP 
reports in the 1980s and 90s show only average figures for each stratum and region. Another change 
in this period pertained to the inclusion of rural non-farm households into the household income and 
expenditure survey. 
To examine changes in cash versus kind wages in the 1980s and 90s, we extracted micro data 
of farm households in Sheikhupura District from the FAP survey. This dataset was used by Kurosaki 
(1998) and Kurosaki and Fafchamps (2002) and covers about 100 households for each of the three 
years (unbalanced panel) between 1988/89 and 1990/91. Sheikhupura District is close to Lyallpur 
District mentioned above, and the two districts have similar agro-ecological conditions. Unfortunately, 
the information on total wage payment distinguishing cash and kind is not available from the dataset; 
instead, detailed information on output disposal is available. With regard to wheat, the most important 
crop and source of staple food in Punjab, 20.5% of the gross output was used as in-kind payment to 
workers and another 1.2% as payment to Kammee households. The sum of the two, which indicates 
the share of the produce used as in-kind payment, is distributed in the range from 0.008 to 0.518, with 
an average of 0.220 (SD: 0.081). On the other hand, the share of in-kind wage receipt in the total labor 
income was distributed between 14% and 53% among non-farm households. Although not directly 
comparable, these figures indicate that in-kind wages continued to be important in Pakistan Punjab in 
the 1980s and 90s. 
Deccan India from 1970 to 2010 
As another example from the Indian subcontinent, two micro datasets from the Deccan 
Plateau are investigated. The first one is collected by the International Crops Research Institute for the 
Semi-Arid Tropics, known as the ICRISAT panel data (Walker and Ryan, 1990). It covers 40 
households each year between 1975 and 1984 in three villages in India’s semi-arid tropics, namely, 
Aurepalle (Andhra Pradesh), Shirapur (Maharashtra), and Kanzara (Maharashtra). Information on 
wage receipt in kind is available in this dataset. 
Figure 2 shows the ten-year time series for each village, reflecting the trends in in-kind wages. 
Two indicators are calculated for the balanced panel (35 households in Aurepalle, 33 in Shirapur, and 
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36 in Kanzara analyzed by Kurosaki, 2001b). The upper portion of Figure 2 plots the share of in-kind 
wage receipt in the total wage receipt in a year, while the lower portion plots the share of households 
that received part of their wage income in kind in that year. The total wage income includes the 
non-agricultural income, although its share is low. Part of the non-agricultural income was paid in 
kind during this period in India. To investigate the overall importance of in-kind wages, the figure 
reports the sum of agricultural and non-agricultural wage income. 
Figure 2 provides a number of observations. First, the share of in-kind wage receipt in the 
total wage receipt differed significantly across villages. Aurepalle had considerably higher shares than 
did the two Maharashtra villages. According to Walker and Ryan (1990, pp.110-114), daily laborers 
in Maharashtra villages in the 1970s were paid only in cash and permanent laborers were paid either 
only in cash or in cash and food grains; in sharp contrast, permanent laborers in Andhra Pradesh 
villages were paid only in kind (crop harvest) and daily laborers were usually paid in paddy. The 
second observation is that the share of in-kind wage receipt in the total wage receipt decreased over 
time. The decrease was the most substantial in Aurepalle. In Kanzara, however, a slight increase in 
the share of in-kind receipts was observed in the early 1980s. This was reflective of an improvement 
in the per-acre cotton output, for which labor was paid on a sharecropping basis. In other words, the 
incidence of in-kind payment did not increase even in this village. Third, the share of households that 
received part of their wage income in kind reveals no trend or spatial differences. In all three villages, 
more than half the sample households received kind wages, with a marginal difference across the 
villages.
10  It can be concluded, therefore, that in-kind payment declined in terms of value but not 
incidence. 
The second dataset from the Deccan Plateau is taken from our 2005 survey of villages in 
Kurnool district, Andhra Pradesh. The data were collected as part of a project on child labor and 
intra-household resource allocation (Fuwa et al., 2006). A random sample of about 400 households 
was chosen from over 32 villages. The dataset contains 840 individuals who reported a positive wage 
income. The share of in-kind wage receipt in the total wage income for these 840 individuals was 
6.2%. Out of 840 individuals, 44 (incidence rate of 5.2%) received positive in-kind wages. The 
in-kind wage receipt of individuals showed large variation: its standard deviation was almost equal to 
the average total wage receipt. Therefore, it can be said that in-kind wages were considerably less 
important for the Kurnool dataset than for the ICRISAT dataset, both in value and incidence. Having 
said this, Kurnool had some seasonal laborers for whom in-kind wage was critically important. 
Further, daily laborers were paid in cash only, without any meals. We could not obtain any 
information as to the practice of paying in-kind wages to daily laborers was discontinued. 
10Interestingly, a national-level Indian report based on the national sample survey (NSS) in 1993/94 shows that 
7.1% of rural Indian households reported receipt of part of the wages or salaries in kind during the 30 days 
preceding the date of survey (NSSO, 1998: 10). Whether this figure indicates a rapid decline in the dispensation 
of in-kind wages following the lapse of the ICRISAT survey period or points to severe underreporting owing to 






         
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
     
 
     
           
   
   
             





     
                                                       
   
   
     
 
   
 
   
   
 
   
 
 
2.3  Myanmar  (Burma) 
Although labor contracts are potentially diverse in terms of incentives, contract periods, and 
payment materials, only one type of contract is generally observed for a particular farm operation in a 
particular village. The diversity is usually observed across villages or time or farm operations or 
crops. 
There are some exceptions to this general tendency. Rural Myanmar data analyzed by 
Kurosaki (2008) reveal different labor contracts for the same farming operation for the same crop in 
the same village.
11  The sample survey was conducted in 2001, covering eight regions representing 
different agricultural zones in Myanmar. The sample comprised 341 farm households and 180 
non-farm households.
12  Farm households were those that had land tillage rights, while non-farm 
households were those that did not.
13  As Kurosaki (2008) showed in detail, unpredictable and 
inconsistent rice procurement policies in Myanmar during the survey period resulted in low income 
for rice-producing farm households and food insecurity for non-farm households. Food security was 
thus the principal concern for the households in the Myanmar sample, especially the low-income rural 
households. 
In rural Myanmar, the two categories of daily and seasonal laborers are clearly 
distinguishable from each other (Takahashi, 2000). In the data used in this paper, the average share of 
income from daily farm labor in the earned income
14  of all sample households was 12.7%, while that 
from seasonal farm labor was 2.6%. Farm households that usually employ daily and seasonal laborers 
sometimes also send family members to perform agricultural labor on others’ farms. The share of 
income from daily farm labor in the income of farm households was 5.0% and that from seasonal 
labor was 0.1%. In contrast, the income share of farm wages was higher among non-farm households: 
34.4% (daily labor) and 9.5% (seasonal labor). 
Table 2 shows the characteristics of 223 seasonal labor contracts observed in 521 sample 
households. The table combines information from seasonal laborers whom we surveyed and 
information from employers/farmers whom we surveyed and who hired seasonal laborers. The upper 
half in the table shows the distribution of the 223 observations by means of payment. For about 30% 
11For instance, for paddy transplanting in one village in Ayeyarwady Division, daily workers involved in 
uprooting (usually males) were paid either 250 kyats per day or 1 kyat per bundle (a bundle of uprooted 
seedlings of paddy). In sugarcane harvesting in one village in Shan State, harvesting workers were paid 200 
kyats per day, a fixed amount of husked rice per day, or a fixed share of harvested cane. 
12See Kurosaki et al. (2004) for details of the sampling procedure, the characteristics of the sample households, 
and farming conditions.
13See Kurosaki (2008) for a brief review of the development of land use rights in Myanmar.
14Overall, the average annual per capita income was 36,000 kyats. If this figure is converted at the market 
exchange rate of 650 kyats/US$ prevailing during the study period, the equivalent dollar figure is $55 per person 
per year. Thus, it can be inferred that income in the sample villages was low, but not very different from the 
average value in rural Myanmar. If the abovementioned income is converted using the price of rice in the 






     
 
       
 
   
   
     
     
   
   
 
 
   
     
   
 





       
   
 
 





   
 
 
of the contracts, the main wage was paid in cash only. Approximately 70% of these 30% were 
accompanied by meals. Therefore, only less than 10% of seasonal labor contracts were purely cash 
contracts involving no in-kind payments.
15  In contrast, in about 60% of the observed contracts, the 
main wage was a combination of cash and in-kind benefits. More than 80% seasonal laborers were 
served meals. To correct for differences in significance among all the categories of compensation in 
the rural economy, the share of each mode of payment in the total compensation was re-calculated in 
kyats,
16  as reported in the last column of Table 2. 
The second half of Table 2 shows the composition of average monthly payment to a seasonal 
laborer in kyats. The average monthly payment was 7800 kyats per seasonal laborer, implying that 23 
man-months of seasonal labor supply were required to earn an amount equal to the average household 
income of a five-member household. Out of 7800 kyats, 40.9% was given in cash payment, 11.2% in 
kind payment such as paddy, 3.7% in other in-kind payment such as tobacco and clothing, and 44.3% 
in meals.
17  The composition reveals a rather high share of in-kind wages paid to seasonal laborers in 
rural Myanmar. 
Table 3 is analogous to Table 2 but covers the characteristics of daily labor contracts, pooling 
information on approximately 1,700 daily laborers and 1,400 farmers employing daily laborers.
18 The 
upper half of the table shows the distribution of the 3,100 observations by means of payment.
19 There 
are four broad categories, each of which includes several sub-categories. First, wages fixed in 
monetary terms and paid per labor hour (kyats/day) were found most frequently, accounting for 79% 
of the 3,100 observations of hired labor. The remaining contracts were diverse. Piece-rate contracts in 
cash, which would prevent workers’ shirking by giving them incentives to complete farm operations 
quickly, accounted for 15% of the 3,100 cases. The last two categories are those associated with the 
main payment in kind. Fixed wages in kind accounted for 2.5% and piece-rates in kind, such as 
sharecropping, accounted for 1.8% of the 3,100 cases. About one-third of the daily work contracts had 
meal provision (usually one meal but in several cases two or three meals). 
The bottom half of Table 3 shows the composition of average daily payment in terms of kyats. 
15This is calculated from the first data row in Table 2 as 29.15*(100.00 – 69.23)/100 = 8.97. 
16To calculate the total monetary worth of in-kind payment, we converted the quantity information provided by 
the employer or the employee into monetary figures using village prices. 
17There is some arbitrariness in converting served meals into money. In this paper, meals were imputed using 
standard coefficients based on the cost of rice. When the quality of meals was higher than the standard, the 
imputed values were adjusted upward. 
18Some households reported multiple contracts with members serving both as employees and employers; some 
reported contracts as employees; some as employers of multiple casual laborers; and the rest neither employed 
others nor were employed by others. 
19In addition to those shown in the table, there are other ways in which the wages paid to daily laborers varied. 
For instance, when the payment was made in cash, such as in kyats/day (fixed wage) or kyats/acre (piece rate), 
some workers were paid a month or two in advance. In such cases, the wage rate was often reduced by 20 to 
33%. Such a large discount suggests the severity of credit constraints faced by poor laborers (monthly interest 
rates in the study regions were in the following ranges: around 10% was charged in the informal credit market 





   
 
     
   
     
 
 
   
 
       
   
   
       
     




   
 
   
   
   
   
 
       
   
   
                                                       
The average daily payment was 184 kyats per daily laborer, implying that 900 man-days of daily labor 
supply were required to earn an amount equal to the average income for a five-member household. 
Out of 184 kyats, 85.9% was paid in cash, 5.7% in kind such as paddy, and 8.4% in meals. Compared 
with seasonal laborers, daily laborers earned more in cash. However, the average in-kind earnings 
were far from negligible; in fact, they constituted the main source of living for some households (note 
that the standard deviation of in-kind daily earnings is 57.1 kyats, which is comparable to a third of 
the average daily payment). Interestingly, if a daily laborer worked 30 days in a month, his monthly 
earning came to be larger than that of a seasonal laborer if we ignore the imputed value of meals, 
whereas the opposite was true if we include the imputed value of meals. 
2.4  Summary of the historical and contemporary datasets survey 
The incidence of in-kind agricultural wages from historical and contemporary datasets is 
summarized in Table 4. The table shows the averages and standard deviations of the share of in-kind 
wages calculated from micro datasets introduced so far. 
Several findings emerge from the table. First, in-kind payment was important in the initial 
stages of development and it continued to be so though its share declined in the long run. Second, 
in-kind wages were more evident in harvesting or cultivating food crops, even in contemporary 
developing countries. Third, there existed considerable geographical diversity. Pakistan’s Punjab has 
the highest incidence of in-kind wages, while in-kind wages ceased to be in effect much earlier in 
Japan, with Myanmar falling between these two countries. Within each country too, the regional 
difference was substantial, as shown for pre-war Japan and ICRISAT India. Fourth, the incidence of 
food grains used as in-kind wages was found more often when the employer was a large-scale farmer 
and the employee a landless worker, implying class disparity. 
3  Theoretical Explanation of In-Kind Wages in the Literature 
Despite the significance of in-kind wages as shown in the previous section, there are few 
theoretical models on in-kind wages in the literature. Five volumes of development economics and 
four volumes of agricultural economics published by Elsevier as part of the Handbook of Economics 
series only briefly mention in-kind wages while describing the characteristics of labor markets in 
developing countries.
20 
In mainstream economics, the dominant view appears to be that in-kind payment in 
agriculture will be completely eroded during the process of transition of a developing economy to a 
market economy. This is because in the latter, paying wages in cash is the most efficient way of 




   
 
     




       
 
 
     
   
 
     
 
     
 
     
       
   
   
     
   
     
   
   
     
       
   
saving on transaction costs. 
However, as shown in the previous section, even in an economy where commercialization has 
penetrated deeply, labor transactions with in-kind payment continue to exist. Economic 
anthropological literature interprets such transactions as those that occur primarily in the dispensing of 
community and religious services (Kasuga, 2007). An implication of this interpretation is that the 
practice of in-kind wages will survive even in commercialized economies because community or 
religious services cannot be completely commercialized. Such views from the perspective of 
economic anthropology find resonance with the views on in-kind wages in development economics, 
wherein it is held that in-kind wages reflect incompleteness in markets. The following sub-sections 
collate theoretical explanations for the existence of in-kind wages and classify them into three groups. 
3.1  Imperfect  market  for  the  good used for in-kind payment 
If the market for a good, which is a necessary good for the employee, is so imperfect that the 
employer can supply it at a cost considerably lower than the market price to the employee, then there 
occurs efficient resource allocation when the employer provides the employee the good as (a part of) 
compensation for the latter’s labor. As an extreme case, if the food market is missing, the payment 
should include food. However, it is not realistic to assume the complete absence of food markets in 
developing countries today. In every corner of the developing world, foods are sold and purchased. 
As a more realistic case, suppose that food transactions are subject to high transport costs, 
because food is weighty. High transaction costs imply that the shadow price of food for large-scale 
farmers who have market surplus is considerably lower than that for marginal farmers who need to 
purchase food from the market (Key et al., 2000). The price differential between net sellers and 
buyers is analogous to the fob-cif band referred to in the international economics literature. If a price 
differential exists, the employer-farmer can reduce his effective payment to workers by paying in 
kind. 
Regarding the provision of meals to workers, one explanation is that it is a time-saving 
mechanism that precludes the need for workers to go home for meals (see for example, Bliss and 
Stern, 1982). This explanation can be interpreted as a version of the fob-cif price band theory. Even if 
the cost of meals in terms of raw materials and cooking fuels is the same for both the employer and 
the employee, the shadow price of meals should include the value of opportunity costs for two-way 
trips between the field and the worker’s home. Since this explanation satisfactorily explains the 
situation in rural Myanmar, the econometric analysis of this paper is focused on the mode of payment 
for the main wages and not the provision of meals. 
Economies of scale and scope could also explain how the employer can supply various goods 
and services at costs lower than the market price to the employee (Alston and Ferrie, 1986). In-kind 
provision of benefits to the employee, through the exploitation of the scale or scope economy, may be 
an effective means for the employer to ensure that his labor requirement is met, since in-kind 
14 
 
   
 
   
   
   
   




     
   
   
   
     
     
   
 
   
   
     
   





     
       
   
       
   
provisions make workers more dependent on the employer (Alston and Ferrie, 1993). 
3.2  Imperfection in labor markets 
Another explanation for the prevalence of in-kind wages focuses on the imperfection in labor 
markets. The fundamental problem in hiring labor is information asymmetry: the employer does not 
know the actual effort level of workers and can neither monitor nor enforce their effort level. 
Although working hours can be monitored or regulated, they are not the real input in determining the 
output. Labor effort is the real input. By paying workers in kind, the employer may be able to render 
such information asymmetry irrelevant. 
The first way of combating information asymmetry in an imperfect labor market is based on 
the nutrition-based efficiency wage theory (Dasgupta and Ray, 1986). The human body has a basic 
metabolic need for calories, which it uses to perform work. There exists a non-linear, S-shaped 
relation between nutrition and athletic output. Given such relations and the possibility that 
malnutrition may be widespread among the low-income labor population, the employer may offer an 
efficiency wage to workers. The efficiency wage is likely to be much higher than the level that clears 
the labor market, and rations the employment among similar landless workers. Only the hired workers 
will receive sufficient nutrition. This is the essence of the efficiency wage model of Dasgupta and Ray. 
However, since money is fungible, a moral hazard may occur in that a worker will not eat enough, 
spend his cash income elsewhere, and provide the employer with inefficient labor. To avoid this moral 
hazard problem, the employer provides meals to daily and seasonal workers and provides the main 
reward in kind. 
The second explanation is related to incentive wages. The orthodox model of sharecropping 
tenancy justifies its existence as a mechanism required to maintain a healthy balance between the 
provision of incentive to work and the provision of risk-sharing against fluctuations in crop output 
(Stiglitz, 1974). By paying the worker proportional to his/her harvest, the worker is incentivized to 
work hard while bearing part of the risk of failure. For the implementation of this mode of payment, 
the total harvest needs to be determined and divided among the workers proportionally. 
Bardhan (1984) explicitly offered these two explanations (nutrition-based efficiency wage 
and incentive wage) for the widespread prevalence of in-kind wages in India. However, there is 
opposition to both theories. Swamy (1997) demonstrated that the existing level of agricultural wages 
was sufficiently high to allow workers to avoid malnutrition, implying that a simple nutrition-based 
efficiency wage theory may not be valid empirically. Further, meals are automatically consumed by 
the worker but any payment in grains may be re-sold and thereby defeat the nutritional objective. In 
the sharecropping case, if the agricultural produce market is perfect, paying the worker the fixed 
proportion of crop in kind is equivalent to paying him/her the monetary value of the crop. In this sense, 
the incentive wage explanation cannot prove that in-kind payment is superior to cash payment. 





     
   






   
 
   
     
 




   
 
       




       
   
   
 
 
   
kind are shown to be superior to incentive wages in cash. In 1994, the author visited several cotton 
farms in southern Punjab in Pakistan, a region known as the cotton zone. The eastern side of a main 
canal was occupied by a large-scale farm, wherein cotton was grown over several hundred hectares of 
land, while the western side was occupied by many farms of medium size, each around 5–10 hectares. 
On both sides, female cotton pickers were hired on a daily basis and paid in incentive wages. In the 
market, the cotton from the eastern farm fetched prices 5–10% lower than the cotton from the western 
farms. According to a survey by agronomists, both types of farms grew the same variety of cotton and 
the quality of cotton on both sides of the canal was the same. The reason for the price differential was 
in the difference in efforts invested by the cotton pickers. On the large-scale farm, cotton pickers were 
paid in cash proportional to the weight of cotton picked by them. This gave the cotton pickers 
incentive to pick wet cottonseeds without putting in the effort to sift out sticks and leaves. The 
monitoring by the employer was not successful in completely avoiding this moral hazard. On the 
other hand, on the medium-sized farms, cotton pickers were paid in kind, that is, the pile of 
cottonseeds was divided in front of the farmer-employer and the pickers received one of the divided 
piles. This gave the cotton pickers the incentive to pick dry cottonseeds only and weed out leaves and 
sticks. The difference in quality led to a price differential. This case demonstrates that in-kind 
incentive wages ensure higher quality in produce. Even in this case, however, if incentive wages can 
be made proportional to the market value of the harvested cottonseeds, there is no difference between 
in-kind and cash incentive wages. In this sense, incompleteness in agricultural produce markets is 
required to justify the existence of in-kind wages. 
3.3  Imperfection  in  insurance  markets 
In developing countries with low per-capita income, like those surveyed in Section 2, poor 
households have few means to hedge against production fluctuations and price shocks that may put 
their livelihood at risk (Fafchamps, 2003; Dercon, 2005). Explicit insurance markets rarely exist in 
villages and informal risk-mitigating arrangements, including informal credit and private transfers, are 
far from efficient in serving as de facto insurance mechanisms (Ligon et al., 2002). This implies that 
poor households in developing countries attempt to mitigate risk through various income-smoothing 
measures (Fafchamps, 1992; Kurosaki and Fafchamps, 2002). Among the potential sources of 
uninsurable risk, food price variability is the most hazardous, since the poor tend to spend primarily 
on food. Under these conditions, if a worker receives part of his/her wage income is paid in food, the 
bulk of family consumption of his/her household is stabilized; this in turn improves the household’s 
welfare level. In other words, kind wages can complement existing insurance mechanisms. To the best 
of my knowledge, Bardhan (1984) was the first to point out this function of kind wages in the 
literature, noting, “Another explanation of kind payment to workers is related to foodgrain price 
uncertainty and differential risk aversion on the part of employers and workers” (p.69). While 




       





   
   
   
 
   
 
   
       
   
   
   





     
 
 
     
 
 
   
     
   
function (e.g., Datta et al., 2004; Kurosaki, 2006; Ito and Kurosaki, 2009). In this paper, a version of 
the theoretical models that share the basic ideas of Kurosaki (2006) and Ito and Kurosaki (2009) is 
presented. In comparison to the model of Datta et al. (2004), the version proposed in the next section 
is more general in that it depends less on the specification of workers’ utility functions, and is more 
appropriate for the analysis of low-income workers in developing countries in that the aversion to 
food price variability is captured explicitly. 
4  A  Theoretical  Model  of  In-Kind Wages to Enhance Food Security 
Each of the theoretical explanations discussed in the previous section presents an interesting 
perspective for the understanding of in-kind wages. For developing economies in a nascent stage of 
development and faced with low nutrition levels among the population, the explanations based on 
incompleteness in crop markets and labor markets may be valid. However, in contemporary 
developing countries, food markets are developed and the average level of nutrition among the rural 
populace has improved substantially. The question that remains to be asked then is, why do in-kind 
wages continue to prevail in such environments? 
As probable answers to this question, this section presents a version of the theoretical models 
based on imperfect insurance markets. The starting point is that thin food markets exist and insurance 
opportunities are limited, especially for low-income households with a high food budget. In such an 
environment, laborer households may find wages paid in kind (food) more attractive for reasons of 
food security. The model presented below will show that the in-kind wage system is a rational one 
even in an economy with well-developed markets for agricultural produce and labor. 
4.1  Basic  settings 
To focus on the trade-off between cash and in-kind wages, the theoretical model in this 
section assumes away contingent labor contract issues such as the monitoring of workers to prevent 
shirking and the interlinking of labor contracts with other contracts such as those for credit and land. 
This section assumes a unitary decision-making process at the household level with respect to labor 
allocation (Singh et al., 1986). Recent literature has proposed non-unitary household models in which 
bargaining among members within a household is modeled explicitly. Since bargaining issues are less 
important in South Asia than in sub-Saharan Africa (Ueyama, 2006), these issues are also disregarded. 
By focusing solely on the trade-off, this model clarifies the significance of laborers’ consideration of 
food security in a straightforward manner. 
To reflect the conditions in low-income developing countries, the commodity “food,” which 
is the main output in production and the main item in consumption, is introduced into the model. To 




   
     
 
   
 
     
   
        
   
   
 
     
 
 
   
 
   
 
 
     
     
   
                                                       
     
     





non-food is normalized at one. Owing to thin agricultural produce markets (Fafchamps, 1992) and 
possible unpredictable interventions by the state in rural marketing (Kurosaki, 2008), the price of food, 
p, fluctuates; its mean is  p . 
For simplicity, we fix the total labor supply at  L , ignoring the labor-leisure choice. Because 
of the limited available opportunity to cope with risk ex post, the worker’s household behaves in a 
risk-averse manner. At the time of deciding on labor allocation, the household’s ex ante payoff is 
given by E[v(y, p)], where E[.] is an expectation operator and v(y, p) is an indirect utility function 
from consuming y, which is allocated between food and non-food after the price risk and farming risk 
are revealed (i.e., y = cnonfood + pcfood). The indirect utility function v(y, p) is assumed to satisfy the 
following conditions: 
vy > 0,  vp < 0,  vyy < 0,  vpp < 0,  vyp > 0,  vyyy > 0.  (1) 
The first two properties are required for a valid indirect utility function. The third guarantees that the 
laborer is risk averse in the Arrow-Pratt sense, while the fourth implies that for a given income level, 
the laborer’s welfare deteriorates when food price variability increases. The fourth property is 
especially appropriate for a poor worker in a developing country who is vulnerable to food 
insecurity.
21 The condition vyp > 0 implies that the laborer’s welfare improves when the correlation 
between food price and income becomes more positive, with the income mean, price mean, income 
variance, and food price variance being constant. Since a positive correlation between food price and 
income level means that real income is more stable, this assumption is also justifiable for a poor 
laborer in a developing country. The last assumption, vyyy > 0, corresponds to “risk prudence” 
(Kimball, 1990). Since prudent risk preferences guarantee that the welfare cost of consumption 
fluctuations decreases with the level of expected consumption, the assumption is appropriate for the 
analysis performed in this paper. 
Given the preferences mentioned above, the worker household decides on labor allocation. 
There are two types of labor contracts to which the household can allocate labor  L  (indicated by 
subscripts 1 and 2). Since the total labor supply is fixed, the decision variables are the shares of each 
type of labor (  j , j = 1,2 ). From each contract, the household obtains a labor return of πj, which is 
stochastic and responsive to the level of the worker’s human capital. Thus, the household’s 
21However, vpp < 0is not always satisfied in popular utility functions used in the literature. For instance, when 
  1 the utility function is Cobb-Douglas with constant relative risk aversion, i.e.,  v( y, p) = (y/p  )  /(1 ), ψ>0, the 
risk aversion should be sufficiently high (   >11/ ), for vpp < 0. In their analysis of contract choice between 
cash and in-kind wages in low-income economies, Datta et al. (2004) adopted a constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) utility function, which includes Cobb-Douglas as a special case. Because they assumed a 
relatively low value for ψ, their analysis turned out to be a case with vpp > 0. In other words, they implicitly 
assumed that the worker’s welfare improves when the food price becomes more variable. Since this is not 




    
   
   
 
 
     
     
 
 
     
 
   
 
   
     
 
     
   
   
     
   
 
   
   
 
                                                       
     
   
 
optimization problem is expressed as
22 
max  E[v( y, p)], 
 j 
subject to the following budget and time constraints 
y = y0  j jL, 
j 
1 2 =1, 
where  y0  is non-stochastic unearned income and   j  ( j = 1,2 ) is also subject to non-negativity 
conditions. 
The first-order condition for the interior solution to this optimization problem is as follows: 
E[vy (1  2)] = 0. 




2)  is obtained. To 
characterize the optimal solution, we apply the first-order Taylor approximation of vy(y, p) in (4),
23 
obtaining  
E[   ]  s( )E[(    )( p  p)/p] E[(    )(y  y)/y]  0, 1 2 1 2  1 2 
where    is the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion, defined as   vyy y / vy , s is the 
budget share of food (Engel’s coefficient), and η is the income elasticity of food demand (all 
evaluated at  y = y = y0   j jL  and  p = p ).
24 
j 
The first term in equation (5) denotes the direct profitability effect. When labor type 1 is 
associated with higher expected payment than labor type 2 is, the labor supply to type 1 will increase. 
The third term implies the direct portfolio effect. When the household is risk averse (ψ > 0), the labor 
type less correlated with the total household income will become more attractive and its share will 
increase. This effect is strengthened when the household is more risk averse (higher ψ) and the 
household is faced with greater risk (higher variance of πj). 
The second term is unique to this class of models. When the household spends a certain share 
of its budget on food (s > 0), the covariance between food price p and wage πj becomes an important 
determinant of the labor supply portfolio. The direction of the covariance effect depends on the sign 
of ψ – η. From Roy’s identity, it can be shown that the assumption vyp > 0 is equivalent to the 
assumption ψ > η in this approximation, which is likely to be satisfied for low-income households 
(Fafchamps, 1992). Therefore, when the household has a stronger food security consideration, it 
prefers a labor type associated with wages that are more positively correlated with food price. This 
effect is strengthened when the household spends more on food (higher s) and the household’s income 
22This is an application of the crop portfolio model by Fafchamps (1992) to the case of labor supply.

23Higher order terms may matter as well. Ignoring terms involving the third-order derivative of v(y, p), such as 

vyyy and vyyp, is equivalent to assuming unskewed distribution for p. 











   
   
 
       
     
     
   
     
 
 
     
 
   
   




     
 








elasticity of food demand is low (lower η). The situation with a higher food budget share and inelastic 
food demand corresponds to rigid food consumption. Households with rigid food demand thus have a 
serious concern about their food security. Since these effects depend on parameters characterizing 
household consumption demand, the second term in equation (5) is called the consumption preference 
effect. 
Finkelshtain and Chalfant (1991) and Fafchamps (1992) demonstrate the theoretical 
possibility of the consumption preference effect leading to a perverse supply response of agricultural 
production with respect to production risk (risk-averse farmers increase the production of a more risky 
crop). Kurosaki and Fafchamps (2002) show that the consumption preference effect is empirically 
significant in explaining poor farmers’ choice of crops in Pakistan. Therefore, it can be supposed that 
the consumption preference parameters may affect choices in labor supply portfolio as well. However, 
this hypothesis has not been tested in existing empirical studies, because of which this paper attempts 
it in the next section. Before conducting empirical tests, we extend the simple model above to fit the 
empirical settings in rural Myanmar. 
4.2  Choice  between  cash and kind wages 
Labor type 1 is associated with fixed wages in kind (staple food) and type 2 with fixed wages 
in cash. For simplicity, we assume that employers are risk neutral and competitive with other 
employers outside agriculture who offer fixed wages in cash at w. This assumption results in the 
following conditions:   = wp/p ,    = w , and  y = y  { wp/p  (1  )w}L . Inserting these 1 2  0 1 1 





1  ={( y0  wL ) /(wL )}{s( )/ }.  (6) 
From this, the following comparative statics can be obtained: 
* *  * *   / s > 0,    /  > 0,    /  < 0,    / y  > 0,  (7) 1 1  1 1 0 
where we assume ψ > η (i.e., vyp > 0). The intuitive meaning of the relations in equation (7) is 
summarized in the following propositions: 
Proposition 1. A laborer whose food expenditure is more rigid will supply more to labor paid 
in kind. The laborer’s food expenditure is defined as more rigid when it occupies a larger share in 
his/her family budget (i.e., Engel’s coefficient is higher) or when its income elasticity is lower. 
Proposition 2. A laborer who is more risk averse in the Arrow-Pratt sense will supply more to 
labor paid in kind. 
Proposition 3. A laborer who has more non-labor, non-stochastic income in cash will supply 





   
   
 









   
     
     
     
     
         
 
       
     
 




     
 




Existing literature on wage contracts does not posit the above propositions. Since the 
propositions above are derived from approximation, approximation errors may exist. Therefore, exact 
solutions are simulated in numerical examples to determine the robustness of the theoretical 
propositions, using the specification with a risk-averse linear expenditure system (LES)
25 that 
satisfies the conditions in equation (1). In numerical simulations, p is assumed to have a uniform or 
triangular distribution, and the optimal portfolios are calculated for different combinations of risk 
preferences and consumption preferences. Simulation results, available on request, support the three 
propositions above. 
Although only two types of work are considered in deriving the three propositions above, a 
proposition similar to Proposition 1 can be derived when other types of labor supply opportunities are 
available. Kurosaki (2006) shows this for the case when an employer hiring labor chooses a contract 
type from the following four choices: (1) fixed wages in cash, (2) fixed wages in kind (paid in food), 
(3) piece rates in cash, and (4) piece rates in kind (paid in food). Ito and Kurosaki (2009) theoretically 
analyze the case where agricultural households decide their labor supply for various types of work, 
including agricultural work on their own farm (unpaid family labor). 
4.3  Empirical  strategy 
Using data from developing countries, it may not be a straightforward task to test the three 
propositions stated in the previous sub-section. Under reduced-form approaches, only s (Engel’s 
coefficient) and y0 are observable among parameters for which comparative statics were derived. 
Income elasticity η and risk preference ψ are not directly observable. Furthermore, s is likely to be 
endogenous so that reverse causality might result in a correlation similar to that in Proposition 1 (e.g., 
households paid in kind accidentally increased food consumption because food was available 
abundantly at home). The direct effect of y0 on the labor portfolio may have a positive impact on  
*
1 
(Proposition 3), but higher y0  may imply a lower ψ, resulting in a negative impact on  
*
1 through 
Proposition 2. One way of testing the propositions could be to structurally estimate preference 
parameters simultaneously with labor supply determinants, as adopted by Kurosaki and Fafchamps 
(2002). Since the Myanmar dataset is cross-sectional, it is difficult to apply this approach.
26 
Considering these difficulties, we replace the three propositions by the following empirical 
25The advantage of the LES is that the number of parameters is small and it offers a plausible prediction of poor 
households’ response to avoid starvation. With the LES specification, starvation is described as a situation 
where income (y) is so low that it is close to the total value of the subsistence needs in consumption (Atkeson 
and Ogaki, 1996; Kurosaki and Fafchamps, 2002). Further, LES utility functions require smaller values of risk 
aversion than Cobb-Douglas or CES utility functions do in order to ensure that vpp < 0. 
26Kurosaki and Fafchamps (2002) controlled household-specific heterogeneity in preferences using household 
fixed effects, and estimated only a few parameters that characterize common preferences in a structural manner. 











   
   
   
     
     
     
     
       
     
 
   
   
 
 
       
 
   
     
 
   
   
   
     




Empirical hypothesis. A laborer whose food expenditure is more rigid will supply more to 
labor paid in kind. The higher the ratio of the laborer’s average food requirement to expected income, 
the more rigid is his/her food expenditure. 
The next section explains how we estimate S_labor, the ratio of the worker’s average food 
requirement to his/her expected income. Our basic empirical strategy is to use reduced-form 
regression models to test whether S_labor positively affects 
*
1  even after controlling for other 
factors that should affect households’ labor supply. The other explanatory variables include assets 
owned by the household, demographic characteristics, and village fixed effects that control regional 
environments, including market conditions. However, the empirical evidence that S_labor has a 
positive impact on  
*
1  may be consistent not only with the theoretical model built on the assumption 
that in-kind wages enhance food security because of missing insurance markets, but also with the 
theoretical model that assumes that in-kind wages help save on transaction costs (e.g., Key et al., 
2000). As an alternative theory that may result in the relation S_labor positively affects  
*
1, it can be 
posited that the shadow price of food for workers who need to purchase food to supplement in-kind 
wage receipt should be higher (market price + transaction costs) than that for workers who sell food 
from their stock, including in-kind wage receipt (market price – transaction costs). Under this 
theoretical model, therefore, workers with higher S_labor are more likely to be associated with higher 

*
1  in the data since such workers are more likely to a net buyer of food. 
To distinguish between the two theories, we perform an additional test using the dummy 
variable D_labor, which is defined as the status of a household wherein the average food requirement 
exceeds the total wage income from agricultural labor supply. If D_labor = 1, the household is a 
definite purchaser of food to supplement in-kind wage receipt, so that its shadow price for food is the 
sum of market price and transaction costs. If D_labor = 0, there is a high probability of the shadow 
price being equal to market price minus transaction costs. As shown by Key et al. (2000), under the 
transaction cost model, a marginal change in purchase/sales has little effect on household behavior as 
long as the household’s status as net purchaser/seller does not change. Therefore, we expect D_labor 
to be a better predictor of  
*
1 than S_labor is, under the alternative thery. On the other hand, under 
the food price risk model, S_labor should be the better predictor of  
*
1 than  D_labor is. To examine 
which of the two variables, S_labor or D_labor, explains  
*
1  better, we estimate a reduced-form 
model by replacing S_labor with D_labor and a reduced-form model by adding D_labor to S_labor. 
22 
 
   
 
 
   
   
 
   
       
   
     
 
     
       
   
   
     
 
       
 
   
   
 
 
     
 
   





5  Estimation Results from Rural Myanmar 
5.1  Data 
Based on the theoretical model in the previous section, a reduced-form model of labor 
allocation is estimated using household data from rural Myanmar collected in 2001. Although the 
dataset contains information on both daily and seasonal laborers, as described in Section 2, the 
econometric exercise investigates only daily labor transactions. This is because seasonal labor 
contracts were mostly predetermined on the basis of long-term relations between the employer and the 
employee (Takahashi, 2000). Therefore, there was generally little scope for a worker to make 
adjustments to his/her contract. On the other hand, the daily labor markets were more 
flexible—worker households were free to decide the amount of labor supply under each type of labor 
contract. Sample households that did not supply any daily farm labor to the market were excluded 
from the regression analysis below. In the empirical analysis, the sample village without variation in 
cash versus kind wages was also excluded. The resulting sample contained 219 households. 
Table 5 shows the definition and summary statistics of empirical variables. The main 
dependent variable is inkind_md, denoting the share of in-kind labor man-days in the total household 
daily farm labor supply. In aggregating contract-level information shown in Table 3 into a 
household-level variable, alternative weights are possible. Since the information on man-days may 
contain measurement errors,
27  another dependent variable, inkind_no, based on the number of 
contracts per household, was calculated and used in robustness check. Although inkind_no, is less 
likely to have measurement errors, it is slightly different from  
*
1  in the theoretical model; that is, 
inkind_md is a more direct proxy for 
*
1 . The correlation coefficient between inkind_md and 
inkind_no is 0.942. 
The above strategy assumes that in-kind wages are paid in crops whose price is perfectly 
collinear with food price in the theoretical model. However, in reality, some cases of in-kind payment 
were observed in rural Myanmar for the harvesting work done for pulses and sugarcane, whose prices 
were not perfectly collinear with the price of rice. Furthermore, cases with wage payment in the case 
of pulses or sugarcane were all based on sharecropping arrangements. Since such arrangements 
stipulate that workers bear part of the output risk, the additional risk may affect their decision making 
regarding labor supply. To avoid this complexity, we implement another robustness check in which 
we limit the sample to cases with time wages only and use inkind_fx, (labor supply in man-days under 
daily labor contracts where the main payment was fixed in kind divided by labor supply in man-days 
under daily labor contracts where the main payment was fixed either in cash or kind). 
Two types of explanatory variables are included. The first type includes variables 
characterizing the worker household. As discussed in the theoretical section, employee characteristics 
27This is because employer-farmers sometimes do not exactly remember the man-days put in by workers when 





       
   
 
 
     
 
 
   
   
     
   
 
   
 
   




       
   
 
   
     
     
 
 
     
   
 
such as food security considerations, risk aversion, and the incentive to shirk, affect the contract 
choice. To represent human capital, sex, age, and level of education (in terms of schooling years) of 
the household head are included. The size of the farmland owned by workers is included as an 
indication of the extent to which they can secure food from their own farmland. Therefore, a finding 
that shows that more landed worker households have reduced the labor supply for work paid in kind is 
consistent with food security considerations. Non-land asset values such as livestock and 
transportation equipment are also included to control for liquidity effects. Finally, as a direct control 
for household food security considerations, S_labor, indicating the relative importance of rice in the 
family budget, is included. 
To control for the endogeneity of s (the food budget share in the theoretical model), the 
empirical model uses S_labor, the monetary value of annual rice consumption required (age-sex 
specific rice consumption coefficients times the vector of the demographic composition of household 
members) divided by the expected household income (asset-specific income coefficients times the 
vector of asset holdings) as a proxy for the importance of rice in the family budget. S_labor is more 
exogenous to households’ short-run decision making than the observed value of the food budget share 
is. With a correlation coefficient of 0.7749 (the linear independence is rejected at the 0.1% level), the 
variable is highly correlated with the observed value of the food budget share. Furthermore, the 
regression results of models replacing S_labor by the observed food budget share are qualitatively 
very similar to those reported in this paper. A related variable, D_labor, is calculated similarly. In 
addition to these variables, demographic characteristics are included to control for other differences in 
preferences. 
The second type of explanatory variables includes the fixed effects of villages. Because the 
mode of wage payments tends to be similar within a village, it is better to control for these effects to 
obtain reliable estimates for the effects of household characteristics on the choice of contract. A 
drawback of this approach is that the effects of village-level variables such as weather risk cannot be 
inferred—an inevitability considering the small number of survey villages. The main empirical test 
thus concerns whether household characteristics that are proxies for Engel’s coefficient and risk 
aversion affect the contract choice in a way predicted by the theoretical model. 
In running regressions, weighted regressions are adopted to control for the different sampling 
probability between farm and non-farm households in each village. Since the dependent variable is 
truncated (it has a range from 0 to 1), two-sided Tobit models are employed as the main specification 
and linear specifications are adopted to check the robustness of regression results. 
5.2  Regression  and  test  results 
5.2.1  Impact of food requirement on the in-kind share 
The main estimation results are reported in Table 6. The coefficient on S_labor in the 
24 
 
   
     







   
 
 
         
       
 
 
   
 
   
     
     
 
   
 
   
 
   
   
 
 
     
regression of inkind_md is 0.69, implying that the share of in-kind contracts increases as the share of 
rice consumption increases, with an elasticity around 0.7. Although its statistical significance level is 
not high, the coefficient is large and supports the prediction of the theoretical model. 
To investigate whether the finding of a positive coefficient on S_labor is robust, a similar 
model is estimated by replacing the dependent variable inkind_md (in-kind share based on man-days) 
either with inkind_no (in-kind share based on the number of observations), which is less subject to 
measurement errors, or with inkind_fx (in-kind share using only the subsample of fixed wages). The 
results are reported in the first three upper-block rows in Table 7. The coefficients on inkind_no and 
inkind_fx are similar to the one on inkind_md and remain statistically significant. Considering that 
several restrictive assumptions are needed to estimate the Tobit model, we re-estimate the model by 
employing a linear specification using Huber-White heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (Table 7, 
rows 4–6, upper block). Because the non-linearity is ignored, the coefficients on inkind_md, 
inkind_no, and inkind_fx become smaller but statistically more significant. 
These results robustly show that S_labor has a positive impact on the in-kind share 
(inkind_md, inkind_no, or inkind_fx). Econometric results thus support the view that a laborer whose 
food expenditure is more rigid will supply more to labor paid in kind, which is consistent with the 
prediction of the theoretical model of in-kind wages focusing on food security in thin food markets. 
Coefficient estimates on other explanatory variables in Table 6 also support this interpretation. 
The dummy variable for female-headed households (Female_labor) has a significantly positive 
coefficient (the in-kind share rises close to 80% if a household is headed by a female). This is another 
piece of evidence supporting the theory that households’ food security considerations affect labor 
supply, because in rural Myanmar females are usually responsible for family food management; 
however, it is also possible that the dummy variable may capture other differences owing to assets or 
income-earning disparity associated with female headship. 
Another interesting result from the analysis is the negative effect of landholding (Land_labor). 
The Tobit results indicate that conditional on it being strictly positive, the share of in-kind contracts 
decreases by 12% as the land owned by the worker household increases by 1 acre. Owning farmland 
and growing the food they need on it comprise an effective strategy for poor households wanting to 
secure food for family consumption; therefore, the above result also appears to support the view that a 
laborer with higher food security concern will supply more to labor paid in kind. Considering the 
possibility that land ownership affects the labor supply through other routes such as difference in 
occupational structure and credit access, we re-estimate a model where the land ownership dummy 
(D_land) is added to control for the heterogeneity associated with the status of being a farm 
household in rural Myanmar. The coefficient on Land_labor remains very similar to the one reported 
in Table 6, while the coefficient on D_land is insignificant. Therefore, marginal landholding matters 
while the status of farm household does not, lending credence to the theoretical explanation based on 





     
   
 
 
   
       
     
 
   
 
   
     
 
   
           




   
   
 
   
   
         
 
The fixed effects of villages are jointly significant, implying that the importance of in-kind 
wages differ across villages. We conjecture that the difference could be associated with an 
inter-village difference in food price risk and the availability of consumption smoothing measures. 
See Ito and Kurosaki (2009) for empirical support of this idea in the case of North India. For the 
current case of Myanmar, however, our conjecture cannot be supported by empirical evidence because 
the number of surveyed villages is small, which makes it difficult to identify what characteristics the 
village fixed effects capture. 
Although not reported, full estimation results corresponding to the models reported in Table 7 
are similar to those reported in Table 6, with respect to the coefficient estimates on Female_labor and 
Land_labor. On trying other specifications with different definitions for household-level education 
and various types of assets, the results are qualitatively similar to those reported in Tables 6 and 7. 
5.2.2  Distinguishing the food price risk model from the food price band model 
It is possible that the empirical evidence that S_labor has a positive impact on inkind_md (or 
inkind_no or inkind_fx) may be consistent with the prediction of a theoretical food price band model 
of in-kind wages (Key et al., 2000). To distinguish the two theoretical explanations, we re-estimate 
the model in Table 6, using D_labor, which is meant to capture the discontinuity of the shadow price 
of food for the worker household. 
As shown in the latter half of Table 7, when inkind_md is the dependent variable and a Tobit 
model is estimated with D_labor replacing S_labor, the coefficient on D_labor  is 0.03 (both 
economically and statistically insignificant). When both S_labor and D_labor are included as 
explanatory variables, only the coefficient on S_labor is significant. In linear specifications, the 
coefficient on S_labor  in a model without D_labor  is the only significant one for inkind_md. 
Although not reported, regression results with inkind_no or inkind_fx as the dependent variable are 
similar to those reported in Table 7. 
These results support the food price risk model more strongly than they support the food price 
band model as the main determinant of in-kind wages in rural Myanmar. Since our dataset has 
detailed information on contract characteristics, contract-level regression models for the determinants 
of contract choice are also estimated by adding employers’ characteristics and crop/farm operation 
fixed effects as a set of explanatory variables. Preliminary results reported by Kurosaki (2006, Tables 
7–9) show that the probability of a wage contract paid in kind increases when the laborer’s food 
expenditure is more rigid and the laborer household has less farmland. On the basis of these results, 
we can conclude that when food security considerations are important for a worker, because of 
poverty and/or thin food markets, he/she is more likely to accept a contract with wages paid in kind 
(food) than a contract with wages paid in cash. The observed regularity can be explained better by a 






   
   
     
   
     
   
     
 
   
   
 
 
   
 
     




     





6  Conclusion 
This paper investigated the function of various modes of wage payment, focusing on the role 
of in-kind wages in enhancing household food security when markets are underdeveloped. To explain 
the importance of in-kind wage payment in the initial phase of economic development, shown through 
historical records and contemporary survey data from Asian countries, this paper developed a 
theoretical model of labor supply under different labor contracts. This was achieved by incorporating 
considerations of food security as the main explanation for in-kind wages. The theoretical model 
predicted that when food security considerations are important for workers, because of poverty and/or 
thin food markets, they supply more labor for work paid in kind (food) than for work paid in cash; this 
prediction was consistent with empirical evidence from rural Myanmar. Estimation results of the 
reduced-form determinants of labor supply robustly showed that workers supply more labor for work 
paid in kind when the share of staple food in their household budget is higher and the farmlands on 
which they produce food themselves are smaller. The empirical test results also provided stronger 
evidence in favor of the theoretical model focusing on food price risk than in favor of the theoretical 
model focusing on food price band. 
Despite the importance of in-kind wage payment in the process of economic development, 
there are few theoretical and empirical investigations explaining its function and rationale in the 
literature. We compare historical and contemporary cases of in-kind wages across countries in Asia, 
and conjecture that in-kind wages disappeared from post-war Japan as soon as marginal farmers, who 
were the major source of agricultural labor supply, were able to grow food on their own farms, 
resulting in lower demand for in-kind payment. In the Indian subcontinent where the bulk of 
agricultural workers remain landless, in contrast, the speed of decline in the incidence of in-kind 
wages has been slow. These descriptive observations and our econometric investigation using 
Myanmar data shed light on how market incompleteness affects resource allocation in the process of 
economic development. As future research, we hope to extend the theoretical model presented in this 
paper so as to allow substitution or complementarity of in-kind arrangements with other types of 
informal insurance mechanisms. Implementing empirical investigations on in-kind wages in pre-war 
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30Table 1. In-Kind Shares in Agricultural Wage Payment in Pre-World War II Japan 
(i) With year fixed effects  (ii) With linear time trend 
Coeff.  (Std. error)  Coeff.  (Std. error) 
Paddy field acreage (normalized)  0.074 ***  (0.013)  0.076 ***  (0.013) 
Upland field acreage (normalized)  -0.008  (0.008)  -0.007  (0.008) 
Regional dummies 
Tohoku  0.005  (0.040)  0.005  (0.037) 
Hokuriku  -0.030  (0.068)  -0.028  (0.071) 
Chubu  0.046  (0.050)  0.052  (0.053) 
Kinki  -0.104 ***  (0.038)  -0.102 ***  (0.037) 
Chugoku  -0.049  (0.053)  -0.044  (0.048) 
Shikoku  0.021  (0.044)  0.023  (0.045) 
Kyushu  0.135 **  (0.052)  0.139 ***  (0.051) 
Year effects 
1926  -0.010  (0.042) 
1927  -0.004  (0.038) 
1928  0.024  (0.043) 
1929  -0.018  (0.039) 
1930  -0.055  (0.041) 
Linear trend  -0.006  (0.007) 
Intercept (reference is Kanto Region in 1925) 
0.228 ***  (0.041)  0.231 ***  (0.032) 
H 0: All slopes=0  F (14,395)  7.21***  F (10,399)  8.74*** 
H 0: No regional effects  F (7,395)  4.80***  F (7,399)  4.71*** 
H 0: No year effects  F (5,395)  0.76  F (1,399)  0.64 
R 
2  0.346  0.338 
Source: Estimated by the author using microdata explained in the text (applicable to all other 
tables). 
Notes: (1) The dependent variable is "In-kind payment by the owner farmer to 
laborers"/"Cash payment and in-kind payment by the owner farmer to laborers". "In-kind 
payment" includes the imputed value of meals.  The sample mean of the dependent variable is 
0.227 (standard deviation at 0.205), weighted by the total payment amount. 
(2) Estimated by a weighted least squares approach (weights are the total payment amount); 
Huber-White robust standard errors are in parentheses; statistically significant at the 1% 
(***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels. 
(3) The number of observations is 410 (60 for year 1925, 62 for year 1926, 65 for year 1927, 
68 for year 1928, 77 for year 1929, and 78 for year 1930). 
31Table 2. Characteristics of Seasonal Laborers in Rural Myanmar, 2001 
1. Distribution by wage types  Number of wage contracts  Distribution in 
Distribution  The ratio  the total 
Number  in the total  with meals  monetary value 
number (%)  (%)  (%) 
Only cash (a)  65  29.15  69.23  25.33 
Only in kind 
(b)  14  6.28  7.14  4.94 
(b) + (c)  17  7.62  100.00  6.35 
Subtotal  31  13.90  58.06  11.30 
Mix of cash and kind 
(a) + (b)  1  0.45  0.00  0.30 
(a) + (c)  117  52.47  95.73  55.87 
(a) + (b) + (c)  9  4.04  100.00  7.21 
Subtotal  127  56.95  95.28  63.38 
Grand total  223  100.00  82.51  100.00 
2. Characteristics of contracts  Mean  SD  Minimum  Maximum 
Contract period in months  5.20  3.32  0.50  13.00 
Monthly payment (in kyats)* 
(a) Cash  3181  1700  0  10000 
(b) In-kind payments: Crop harvest and grains  870  3227  0  35000 
(c) In-kind payments: Tobacco, clothing, etc.  289  332  0  1900 
(d) Meals  3446  1781  0  4500 
Total payment （a + b + c + d)  7786  3224  1111  35000 
Note: * The means and SDs (standard deviations) were weighted by the total payment amount. 
32Table 3. Characteristics of Daily Laborers in Rural Myanmar, 2001 
1. Distribution by wage types  Number of wage contracts  Distribution 
Distribution  The ratio  in the total 
Number  in the total  with meals  monetary 
(%)  (%)  value (%) 
(a) Time wage in cash 
kyats/day  2437  78.61  38.70  77.68 
Other  71  2.29  18.31  1.01 
Subtotal  2508  80.90  38.12  78.69 
(b) Piece-rate wage in cash 
kyats/acre  154  4.97  12.34  6.94 
kyats for the whole operation  100  3.23  19.00  2.73 
kyats/unit of farm work  152  4.90  46.05  4.19 
kyats/unit of crop output  52  1.68  9.62  1.74 
Subtotal  458  14.78  24.67  15.60 
(c) Time wage in kind 
Cleaned rice/day  65  2.10  52.31  1.99 
Unhusked paddy/day  12  0.39  50.00  1.02 
Subtotal  77  2.49  51.95  3.01 
(d) Piece-rate wage in kind 
Sharecropping  4  0.13  25.00  0.15 
Crop output/acre  21  0.68  0.00  1.18 
Crop output for the whole operation  30  0.97  10.00  1.33 
Other  2  0.06  50.00  0.03 
Subtotal  57  1.84  8.77  2.69 
Grand total  3100  100.00  35.94  100.00 
2. Characteristics of contracts*  Mean  SD  Minimum  Maximum 
Total labor supply (days per household per year)  239.1  221.0  5.0  1825.0 
Daily payment (in kyats)** 
Cash  158.2  64.3  0.0  733.3 
In-kind payments: Crops and grains  10.5  57.1  0.0  900.0 
Meals  15.5  20.2  0.0  150.0 
Total payment  184.2  84.7  30.0  950.0 
Notes: * The number of observations for daily laborers is 270 as the data are at the household lebel and households with
 
zero daily laborer wage income and outliers are excluded.
 




33Table 4. In-Kind Shares in Agricultural Labor Markets in Asia (Summary) 
Average in-kind shares (SD) Country (Region)  Period  Item  NOB 
Including meals  Excluding meals 
Japan (excluding Hokkaido)  1925-30  In-kind payment by the owner 
farmer to laborers divided by 
the total payment (Table 1) 
British India (Punjab)  1934/35  In-kind payment by farmers to 
-35/36  permanent laborers divided by 
the total payment 
India (ICRISAT, Aurepalle)  1975-84  In-kind receipt in total wage 
receipt by rural households 
(Figure 2) 
India (ICRISAT, Shirapur  1975-84  In-kind receipt in total wage 
and Kanzara)  receipt by rural households 
(Figure 2) 
India (Andhra Pradesh,  2005  In-kind receipt in total wage 
Kurnool)  receipt by rural households 
Myanmar  2001  In-kind payment divided by 
total payment to seasonal 
laborers (Table 2) 
Myanmar  2001  In-kind payment divided by 
total payment to daily laborers 
(Table 3) 
271  0.230  (0.208) 
47  0.711  (0.343)  0.468  (0.347) 
225  0.739  (0.338) 
633  0.085  (0.120) 
840  0.062  (0.236)  0.062  (0.236) 
223  0.591  (0.229)  0.149  (0.275) 
270  0.141  (0.182)  0.057  (0.161) 
Note: See text for data sources. All means and SDs (standard deviations) were weighted by the value amount. 
34Table 5. Variables Used as Determinants of In-Kind Shares in Rural Myanmar 
Variable  Definition  Mean  SD  Min  Max 
Dependent variables 
inkind_md  (Annual labor supply in days under daily labor  0.052  0.171  0.000  1.000 
contracts where main payment was in kind)/(Total 
annual labor supply in days under daily labor 
contracts) 
inkind_no  (Number of labor supply contracts where main  0.046  0.157  0.000  1.000 
payment was in kind)/(Total number of labor 
supply contracts) 
inkind_fx  (Annual labor supply in days under daily labor  0.044  0.156  0.000  1.000 
contracts where main payment was in kind and 
fixed in quantity)/(Annual labor supply in days 
under daily labor contracts where main payment 
was fixed in value or quantity) 
Explanatory variables 
Female_labor  Dummy variable for a female-headed household  0.073  0  1 
Age_labor  Age of the household head  43.406  12.152  20  80 
Educ_labor  Completed years of formal schooling of household  2.785  2.450  0  10 
head (value of 2 years assigned when the head 
attended monastic school) 
Land_labor  Size of farmland holding in acres managed by the  2.996  4.479  0  22 
employee's household 
S_labor  Value of the annual amount of rice consumption  0.275  0.233  0.026  1.000 
required (age-sex specific rice consumption 
coefficients times the vector of the demographic 
composition) divided by the expected household 
income (asset-specific income coefficients times the 
vector of asset holding) (truncated at 1 if greaer 
than unity) 
D_labor  Dummy variable for a household where the value of  0.356  0.000  1.000 
the annual amount of rice consumption required 
(age-sex specific rice consumption coefficients 
times the vector of the demographic composition) is 
greater than the total daily labor supply from the 
household multiplied by the average daily wage 
Assets_labor  Total worth of assets (non-land: transportation  0.143  0.112  -0.115  0.674 
equipment, livestock, agricultural machinery, 
monetary assets, etc.) owned by the employee 
household (in million kyats) 
hsizemc2  No. of male children in the household (under 15)  0.932  0.986  0  4 
hsizema2  No. of male adults in the household  (15 to 60)  1.598  0.959  0  5 
hsizefc2  No. of female children in the household (under 15)  0.922  0.976  0  3 
hsizefa2  No. of female adults in the household (15 to 60)  1.676  1.075  0  6 
Notes: (1) The number of observations is 219 (considering households with choice between cash and in-kind wages that 
supplied a positive amount of daily agricultural labor), except for "inkind_fx" where the number is 213 (considering 
households that supplied a positive amount of daily agricultural labor for which main payment was fixed). 
(2) In addition to the variables in this table, village fixed effects are included in regression models. 
(3) All means and SDs (standard deviations) were weighted to reflect the difference in sampling probability across villages and 
across farm and non-farm households. 
35Table 6. Determinants of the In-Kind Share in Household Labor Supply in Myanmar (1) 
Dependent var.=inkind_md 
Coeff.  (Std. error) 
Female_labor  0.7883 *** (0.256) 
Age_labor  -0.0038  (0.006) 
Educ_labor  0.0097  (0.019) 
Land_labor  -0.1234 *** (0.036) 
S_labor  0.6885 *  (0.360) 
Assets_labor  0.4705  (0.630) 
hsizemc2  -0.0144  (0.051) 
hsizema2  0.0401  (0.068) 
hsizefc2  -0.0659  (0.054) 
hsizefa2  0.1099 *  (0.058) 
Village fixed effects: jointly significant at the 1% level 
NOB  219 
chi2(16) for zero slope  93.25*** 
Pseudo R2  0.409 
Log likelihood  -67.30 
Notes: (1) Estimated by a two-sided weighted Tobit. 
(2) Significant at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10%(*) levels. 
36Table 7. Determinants of the In-Kind Share in Household Labor Supply in Myanmar (2) 
Proxy variable for Estimation
Dependent var.  the rigidness of  Coeff.  (Std. error)
methodology 
food demand 
(1) Robustness check with respect to dependent variables and estimation methodology 
inkind_md  Tobit  S_labor  0.6885 *  (0.360) 
inkind_no  Tobit  S_labor  0.5822 *  (0.330) 
inkind_fx  Tobit  S_labor  0.6975 *  (0.369) 
inkind_md  WLS  S_labor  0.1292 **  (0.066) 
inkind_no  WLS  S_labor  0.1065 **  (0.042) 
inkind_fx  WLS  S_labor  0.1281 *  (0.075) 
(2) Distinguishing between two models: incomplete insurance markets vs. food market price bands 
inkind_md  Tobit  S_labor  0.6885 *  (0.360) 
inkind_md  Tobit  D_labor  0.0274  (0.132) 
inkind_md  Tobit  S_labor  0.8009 *  (0.411) 
D_labor  -0.0924  (0.151) 
inkind_md  WLS  S_labor  0.1292 **  (0.066) 
inkind_md  WLS  D_labor  0.0455  (0.036) 
inkind_md  WLS  S_labor  0.1075  (0.076) 
D_labor  0.0313  (0.040) 
Notes: (1) In all regression models, the explanatory variables listed in Table 6 are included. In this table, 
coefficient estimates on S_labor and D_labor are reported. Full results are available on request from the 
author. 
(2) "Tobit" in the "Estimation methodology" column means a weighted two-sided Tobit model as in Table 6. 
"WLS" refers to linear regression results with Huber-White heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, 
weighted by sampling probability. 
(3) Significant at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10%(*) levels. 
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Figure 1. In-Kind Shares in Agricultural Wage Payment in Japan, 1925
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Figure 2. In-Kind Shares in Wage Receipt among ICRISAT Households in India 
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